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The Sherlock Holmes Canon
Anita S. Krishnakumar*
ABSTRACT
Many of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases infer meaning
from Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record. Colorfully referred to as the “dog that did not bark” canon, after a Sherlock Holmes story
involving a watchdog that failed to bark while a racehorse was being stolen,
the interpretive presumption holds as follows: if a new law or statutory amendment would significantly change the existing legal landscape, Congress can be
expected to comment on that change in the legislative record; thus, a lack of
congressional comment regarding a significant change can be taken as evidence that Congress did not intend a change in the law. “Failure to comment”
arguments typically arise when the Supreme Court considers the meaning of a
statutory provision that has been amended and an interpretation of the statute
is advanced that arguably would change the status quo. Surprisingly, this canine canon of construction has received little theoretical attention—and what
little attention it has received has tended to be positive, assuming that the canon leads courts to follow congressional intent. But there are several practical
and theoretical problems with the assumptions underlying the canon.
This Article first examines how courts employ the Sherlock Holmes canon in practice. It then evaluates the canon’s normative and theoretical implications in detail. Ultimately, it argues that the Sherlock Holmes canon is a
“clear statement” rule in disguise, in that it allows judges to freeze certain legal
rules in place and to shift the institutional burden to Congress to be exceptionally clear when it wishes to effect certain kinds of legal change. The Article
concludes that this clear statement effect is problematic and that the canon
should be invoked only in rare cases, when there is special reason for courts to
expect or require Congress to comment on a change in the law.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a little-studied practice in the United States Supreme
Court’s statutory interpretation cases of inferring meaning from Congress’s failure to comment, in the legislative record, on a substantial
change effected by a law it is enacting. Colorfully referred to as the
“dog that did not bark” canon after a Sherlock Holmes story in which
a watchdog failed to bark while a racehorse was stolen,1 the interpretive presumption made by the Court in such cases is as follows: if a
statutory interpretation would significantly change the existing legal
landscape, Congress can be expected to comment on that change in
the legislative record; thus, a lack of congressional comment regarding
a significant change can be taken as evidence that Congress did not
1 See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE COMPLETE
NOVELS AND STORIES 521, 540 (2003). In Silver Blaze, the fact that the watchdog did not bark
while the racehorse was being stolen led the detective to deduce that the thief was someone the
dog knew—namely, his trainer. This plotline is sometimes referred to as “the curious incident of
the dog in the night-time”:
Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): “Is there any other point to which you would
wish to draw my attention?”
Holmes: “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
Gregory: “The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
Holmes: “That was the curious incident.”
Id. at 540.
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intend that interpretation.2 In the Sherlock Holmes story, Silver
Blaze, the inference drawn from the dog’s silence was that nothing
unusual had happened during the night; similarly, in the Court’s jurisprudence, the inference drawn from Congress’s silence is that nothing
unusual has occurred with respect to the relevant legal rule. “Failure
to comment” or “dog that did not bark” arguments typically arise
when the Supreme Court considers the meaning of a statutory provision that has been amended and an interpretation is advanced that
arguably would change the status quo.
This interpretive canon has been invoked with increasing frequency in recent years,3 rearing its head, for example, in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion this past Term in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.4 In Burwell, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for
interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) to extend religion-based exemptions to for-profit corporations, arguing
that such a rule worked a significant change in First Amendment law
and precedents.5 If Congress had intended “a change so huge,” she
argued, it would have made a “clarion statement to that effect” in
RFRA.6 Yet “[t]he text of RFRA makes no such statement and the
legislative history does not so much as mention for-profit corporations.”7 A few Terms earlier, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in
Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education8 invoked a more forceful version of the Sherlock Holmes canon, insisting
that a statutory amendment did not repudiate the Department of Education’s longstanding interpretation of the relevant statute because,
among other reasons:
No one at the time—no Member of Congress, no Department of Education official, no school district or State—expressed the view that this statutory language (which, after all,
was supplied by the Secretary) was intended to require, or
did require, the Secretary to change the Department’s system of calculation, a system that the Department and school
2

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 634 (1990).

Prior to 1980, the Court had explicitly invoked the canon only four times. See infra
Appendix. Since then, members of the Court have advanced arguments of this type in at least
twenty-seven different cases. Id.
3

4 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795–96 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
5 See id. at 2795–97.
6 Id. at 2796.
7 Id. (emphasis added).
8 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
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districts across the Nation had followed for nearly 20
years . . . .9
As these two recent Roberts Court cases highlight, inferences
based on congressional failure to comment can be elaborate, explaining in detail why Congress should have been expected to comment—
and why its failure to do so should be taken as significant; or they can
be succinct, merely noting that the legislative record is silent and that
Congress would not have imposed a substantial change without discussion. Failure to comment arguments date back at least to the
1940s, but have been employed much more frequently by the Roberts
and Rehnquist Courts than by their predecessors.10 Yet despite its increasing popularity, the Sherlock Holmes canon has generated surprisingly little debate or theoretical attention from members of the
Court or scholars.11 This lack of scrutiny is curious, particularly because, as Part III of this Article explains, the canon effectively creates
a “clear statement” rule of unprecedented form—shifting the institutional burden to Congress to make statements about a statute’s scope,
and to do so in the legislative history.
The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the doctrinal and
theoretical understanding of the role that “failure to comment” arguments play in statutory interpretation. The Article proceeds in three
parts. Part I presents a doctrinal framework for understanding judiId. at 91.
Other recent Supreme Court invocations of the “dog that did not bark” canon include
Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2696 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (refusing to
interpret statute to effect change “[i]n the absence of any indication from the statutory text or
legislative history that § 3582(c)(2) was meant to fundamentally alter the way in which Rule
11(c)(1)(C) operates”), Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 311 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[N]either the initial bills reported
by the Senate and House Committees nor statements by individual Members of Congress about
subsequent versions of the legislation suggest any consideration or debate about expanding the
pre-1986 bar to apply to state or local government sources.”), and United States v. Ressam, 553
U.S. 272, 282 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If Congress, in neglecting to add the words ‘in
relation to,’ sought to create a meaningful distinction between the explosives and firearms statutes, one would think that someone somewhere would have mentioned this objective.”). For
references by the Rehnquist and earlier Courts, see infra Appendix (non-exhaustive list of dog
that did not bark cases).
11 A handful of scholars have discussed the canon in passing, but none has examined it
closely or critically. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 89–94 (1999); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 634–35; Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity
Church: The Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1053, 1096 n.202
(2009); Rebecca M. Kysar, Penalty Default Interpretive Canons, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 953, 962–64
(2011); John M. DeStefano III, Note, On Literature as Legal Authority, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 521,
548–49 (2007).
9
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cial inferences based on Congress’s failure to comment. Three forms
of dog that did not bark arguments emerge from the Court’s caselaw:
(1) the “no mention” form, which merely notes that the legislative
history does not mention a substantial change in the law;12 (2) the “silence-is-telling” form, which makes a detailed argument that if Congress had intended a substantial change in the law, someone would
have commented on it in the legislative record;13 and (3) the “bankruptcy rule,” which establishes a presumption that Congress intends to
preserve pre-Bankruptcy Code practice unless the legislative history
indicates otherwise.14
Although increasingly common, “failure to comment” arguments
are not necessarily successful in all cases. A number have been made
in dissenting opinions, such as Justice Ginsburg’s in Hobby Lobby.15
And while the Court often infers great meaning from Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record, it also sometimes rejects inferences based on legislative silence, noting at times that “a court
cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the
dog that did not bark.”16 Part I seeks to analyze and categorize the
Sherlock Holmes canon cases, identifying factors that tend to contribute to the Court’s willingness to infer meaning from legislative silence
and factors that tend to lead the Court to discount such silence. Part I
is largely descriptive, seeking to illuminate the Court’s interpretive
12 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795–97 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2696–97 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.44 (2001); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 586–89 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 See, e.g., Graham Cty., 559 U.S. at 311 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Ressam, 553 U.S. at
282 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 90–93; Martin v. Franklin Capital
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137 (2005); City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 131–32
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring); Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S.
316, 342–43 (1999); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176–77 (1993).
14 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 539 (2004); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990), superseded by statute, Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865, as recognized in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83
n.4 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 381–82 (1988).
15 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Graham
Cty., 559 U.S. at 311 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 13–14
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ron Pair,
489 U.S. at 251–54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 600–01
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16 Harrison, 446 U.S. at 592; see also Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50,
73–74 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Canon of Canine Silence that the Court invokes today
introduces a . . . phenomenon [ ] under which courts may refuse to believe Congress’s own words
unless they can see the lips of others moving in unison.”).
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practices. Overall, it concludes that there is little coherence or consistency in the Court’s application of the Sherlock Holmes canon.
Part II turns to the jurisprudential question whether Congress’s
failure to comment on an interpretive change really tells judges anything meaningful about congressional intent in these cases—and
whether inferences based on such failure are a justifiable or reliable
interpretive tool. This Part explores several theoretical and practical
problems with inferences based on Congress’s failure to comment,
agreeing with and elaborating upon the relatively thin judicial criticism of this form of interpretive argument. Ultimately, Part II argues
that inferences based on legislative silence are dubious if interpreters
mean them literally, as an actual expectation that Congress could not
have intended to make a substantial change without noting that in the
legislative record.
Part III moves beyond the Court’s surface rhetoric and posits that
rather than seeking to reflect true legislative intent, the dog that did
not bark canon effectively operates as a clear statement rule. That is,
the canon assumes a baseline state of the law, and requires that
changes from that baseline be accompanied by explicit legislative acknowledgment. In one sense, then, the dog that did not bark or failure to comment rule is simply a continuity canon, similar to many
other canons and doctrines that seek to ensure predictability and stability in the law.17 On the other hand, however, the canon is an extraordinary institutional burden-shifting device, in that it requires
legislators to say something specific in the legislative history, rather
than the statutory text—and in that it leaves identification of the baseline state of the law almost entirely to the discretion of the interpreter.
As a result, I argue that although the Justices view attentiveness to
congressional silence as part of their duty as faithful agents of the legislature, they often end up using the dog that did not bark canon to
guard against changes they find normatively problematic. Given this
reality, it is worth asking whether the dog that did not bark canon
should be abandoned, or whether it serves any useful role in statutory
interpretation. Part III argues that there are a few limited circumstances in which the canon does serve a useful role, such as where
Congress can be expected to comment in order to let an agency know
that it is overturning an established administrative interpretation or
where significant reliance interests will be upset by a change in the law
and it thus makes sense to ensure that Congress intends such a result.
17 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 943–45 (1992).
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Part III concludes by proposing a very limited, narrow application of
the dog that did not bark canon in only such cases.
I. THE DOG THAT DID NOT BARK CANON

IN

PRACTICE

The Supreme Court’s Sherlock Holmes or dog that did not bark
cases generally can be divided into three categories: (1) the “no mention” cases, in which the Court posits that the rejected interpretation
would work a drastic change in the law, and simply notes that there
was no mention of such a change in the legislative history (or, in some
cases, in the statutory text);18 (2) the “silence-is-telling” cases, in
which the Court posits that the rejected interpretation would work a
drastic change in the law, emphasizes that no one discussed such
change in the legislative record, and insists that if Congress had intended the change, someone surely would have commented on it;19
and (3) the bankruptcy cases, in which the Court invokes a bankruptcy-law-specific presumption that Congress does not intend to effect changes to pre-Code practice, unless the legislative history
indicates otherwise.20
A. The “No Mention” Cases
In a number of cases, the Court barely invokes the dog that did
not bark rule, making only passing reference to Congress’s silence
about a significant change in the law. Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
opinion in Hobby Lobby, discussed in the Introduction, is a good example.21 Another example is Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion
in Freeman v. United States.22 Freeman held that a criminal defendant
who is sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement is eligible to petition
for a sentence reduction if the Sentencing Commission later retroactively amends the recommended sentencing range for his offense.23
Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court’s ruling as applied to defendant Freeman, but disagreed with the plurality’s categorical conclusion that all sentences imposed pursuant to a plea agreement are
based on the Sentencing Guidelines, and therefore eligible for reduction.24 Rather, she argued, sentences imposed under a plea agreement
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Supra note 12.
Supra note 13.
Supra note 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 4–7.
Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).
Id. at 2695.
See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

R
R
R
R
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are “based on” the agreement itself.25 The plurality’s contrary construction, Justice Sotomayor insisted, would fundamentally alter the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing plea agreements.26
Invoking the Sherlock Holmes canon, she then declared that “[i]n the
absence of any indication from the statutory text or legislative history
that [the Sentencing Guidelines amendment] was meant to fundamentally alter the way in which [the Federal Rules] operate[ ],” she could
not endorse the plurality’s statutory reading.27
Freeman and Hobby Lobby are typical of “no mention” cases in
that they spend very little space talking about the legislative record.28
Instead, the opinions emphasize the magnitude of the legal change
that an interpretation would effect—and then note, almost as an aside,
that the legislative history says nothing about such significant
change.29 Interestingly, while the “no mention” cases certainly imply
that if Congress intended to make a significant change in the law, the
legislative history would reflect this, they do not always make this logical connection explicitly.30 Further, as both Freeman and Hobby
Lobby illustrate, some “no mention” cases reference the statutory text
in tandem with the legislative history—focusing not so much on Congress’s failure to discuss the supposed change in the legislative record
per se, but on the fact that there is “scant indication” of any kind that
Congress intended to change the law.31
Still other “no mention” cases rely heavily on a separate substantive canon or presumption and invoke the Sherlock Holmes canon
only as a secondary argument that lends support to the construction
Id. at 2695–96.
Id. at 2696.
27 Id. at 2696.
28 See, e.g., id.; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791–93, 96 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (briefly reviewing legislative history in context of another argument
and later asserting that Congress did “not so much as mention” change majority read into
statute).
29 See, e.g., Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2796 (“Had Congress intended RFRA to initiate a
change so huge, a clarion statement to that effect likely would have been made in the legislation.
The text of RFRA makes no such statement and the legislative history does not so much as
mention for-profit corporations.” (citations omitted)).
30 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.44 (2001) (“The legislative history is significant because, despite its comprehensive character, it contains no evidence that Congress specifically considered the question of the applicability IIRIRA § 304(b) to pre-IIRIRA convictions.”).
31 Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 53 (2004); see Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Freeman, 131 S. Ct at 2696–97 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 588–89 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“This sort of unremarkable change is consistent with the purpose of the statute, as
well as with a legislative history that fails to make any comment on its significance.”).
25
26
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dictated by the other substantive canon. Consider, for example, INS
v. St. Cyr,32 in which the Supreme Court held that provisions in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (“IIRIRA”) that repealed the Attorney General’s power to grant
aliens discretionary relief from deportation did not apply retroactively
to an alien who was convicted of a crime before those statutes took
effect, even though the alien’s removal proceedings did not occur until
after AEDPA’s and IIRIRA’s effective dates.33 In so ruling, the
Court relied primarily on the presumption against retroactive application of statutes and a canon dictating that ambiguities in deportation
statutes should be construed in favor of aliens.34 It also dropped a
footnote that referenced the dog that did not bark canon in passing,
noting that the legislative history “contains no evidence that Congress
specifically considered the question of the applicability of IIRIRA
§ 304(b) to pre-IIRIRA convictions.”35
In short, the “no mention” cases treat Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record as a side note, or ancillary fact that lends
support to a statutory construction reached primarily through other
interpretive tools. Some of the cases do not even reference the dog
that did not bark canon or Sherlock Holmes by name, though the presumption they subtly invoke is very much the one embodied in the
canon.36
B. The “Silence-is-Telling” Cases
The “silence-is-telling” cases are by far the most numerous form
of dog that did not bark cases.37 In these cases, the Court argues that
the rejected interpretation would effect a sea change in the law and, in
contrast to the “no mention” cases, emphasizes that there was no discussion of the change in the legislative record. The Court does not
merely note in passing that the legislative record is silent but, rather,
insists that if Congress had intended the change at issue, that change

32

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

33

Id. at 326.

34

Id. at 320.

35

Id. at 320 n.44.

See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2791–93, 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Freeman,
131 S. Ct. at 2696–97 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
36

37

See infra Appendix (listing cases by category).
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“would have surely drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative comment.”38
The “silence-is-telling” cases differ from each other in the extent
to which they discuss Congress’s failure to comment, but all of the
cases place significant weight on the fact that Congress said nothing
about the contemplated change. A leading case is Church of
Scientology of California v. IRS,39 which involved interpretation of an
Internal Revenue Code provision that protects the confidentiality of
tax “returns” and “return information.”40 The question raised was
whether Church of Scientology could obtain certain documents from
the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) if those
documents were redacted to delete the parts that would identify a particular taxpayer.41 The Court held that redaction of identifying material did not suffice to make the documents accessible under FOIA.42
It rested this ruling, in part, on an argument that Congress would not
so quietly have adopted an amendment that would permit the disclosure of all “return information.”43 Such a change, the Court maintained, “would have, it seems to us, at a minimum engendered some
debate in the Senate and resulted in a rollcall vote.”44 The Court went
on to argue that:
All in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that
didn’t bark,’ that an amendment having the effect petitioner
ascribes to it would have been differently described by its
sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill.45
These are extraordinarily specific assumptions about what the
legislative process would have looked like if Congress had intended
the interpretation advanced by the Church of Scientology. The Court
is not merely expecting some kind of comment, but is predicting particular responses that should have come from particular legislative actors. Most of the “silence-is-telling” cases do not make such detailed
claims, although some do reference specific places in the legislative
38 Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137 (2005) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)).
39 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9 (1987).
40 Id. at 13–14; see 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).
41 Church of Scientology, 484 U.S. at 10–11, 13–14.
42 Id. at 17–18.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added).
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record where one might expect to see Congress discuss the change at
issue.46
Another leading example of a lengthy discussion and strong inference from legislative silence is Department of Commerce v. U.S.
House of Representatives,47 which raised the question whether the
1976 revisions to the Census Act prohibit statistical sampling for apportionment purposes.48 A plurality of the Court held that the Act
does prohibit sampling, and relied significantly on dog that did not
bark inferences to support this reading.49 Specifically, Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion stressed the fact that, “[a]t no point during the debates over these amendments did a single Member of Congress suggest that the amendments would so fundamentally change
the manner in which the Bureau could calculate the population for
purposes of apportionment.”50
The opinion went on to note that:
This is true despite the fact that such a change would profoundly affect Congress by likely shifting the number of seats
apportioned to some States and altering district lines in many
others. Indeed, it tests the limits of reason to suggest that
despite such silence, Members of Congress voting for those
amendments intended to enact what would arguably be the
single most significant change in the method of conducting
the decennial census since its inception. That the 1976
changes to §§ 141 and 195 were not the focus of partisan debate is almost certainly due to the fact that the Members of
Congress voting on the bill read the text of the statute, as do
we, to prohibit the use of sampling in determining the population for apportionment purposes.51
Church of Scientology and Department of Commerce v. U.S.
House of Representatives contain particularly strong inferences from
congressional failure to comment but, significantly, neither case relies
on Congress’s silence as the primary basis for its construction. Rather,
Church of Scientology relies primarily on the purpose behind the relevant Tax Code provision,52 and Department of Commerce stresses the
46 See, e.g., Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S. 280, 311 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting absence of statements in “initial bills
reported by the Senate and House Committees” and “by individual Members of Congress”).
47 Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
48 Id. at 320.
49 Id. at 334.
50 Id. at 342.
51 Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
52 See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16–17 (1987).
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history and contemporaneous agency interpretation of the 1976
amendment before arguing that the plurality’s reading “finds support”
in the lack of congressional debate and discussion about sampling.53
Most other “silence-is-telling” cases similarly invoke the dog that did
not bark canon in a corroborative fashion, as one of many interpretive
tools pointing toward a particular construction of the statute.
Consider, for example, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,54
which involved interpretation of the Immigration Nationality Act
(“INA”).55 At the time, section 243(h)(1) of the INA prohibited the
Attorney General from deporting an alien to a country where his life
or freedom might be threatened.56 Sale presented the question
whether section 243(h)(1) applied only within the United States, or
also to actions taken by the U.S. Coast Guard on the High Seas, beyond the territorial sea of the United States.57 An amendment to the
INA had removed the phrase “within the United States” from section
243(h)(1) and added the word “return”58 so that the provision read,
“[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or
freedom would be threatened in such country.”59 The Supreme Court
held that the amendment was designed to eliminate section
243(h)(1)’s distinction between deportable and excludable aliens, not
to make the section applicable outside the territorial limits of the
United States.60 In so ruling, the Court invoked a canon of construction known as the “presumption against extraterritorial application of
domestic laws” and argued that the default understanding should be
that the 1980 amendment did not make the INA applicable outside
the United States.61 In support of its conclusion, the Court also noted
that Congress’s intent to make section 243(h)(1) apply to exclusion as
well as deportation proceedings was “plainly identified in the legislative history” of the 1980 amendment—and that the legislative history
contained no indication that the amendment intended to provide for
the statute’s extraterritorial application.62 “It would have been ex53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

See Dep’t of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 335–42.
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
Id. at 158.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
Sale, 509 U.S. 158–59.
Id. at 175–76.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
Sale, 509 U.S. at 176–77.
See id. at 173.
Id. at 176.
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traordinary for Congress to make such an important change in the law
without any mention of that possible effect,” the Court observed, yet
“[n]ot a scintilla of evidence of such an intent can be found in the
legislative history.”63
Few “silence-is-telling” cases discuss Congress’s failure to comment in as much detail as Church of Scientology or the Department of
Commerce case but several, like Sale, give specific reasons why congressional comment should have been particularly expected with respect to the change at issue—and why congressional silence regarding
the change should be treated as particularly meaningful. The list below spotlights some of those reasons:
• The debates or other legislative history surrounding enactment of the amendment at issue were “unusually extensive” or “lengthy,” yet did not contain any discussion of
the contemplated change in the law.64
• The interpretive change not discussed in the legislative history would produce an “absurd” or “incoherent” result.65
• The rejected interpretation would change the implementing agency’s longstanding interpretation of the statute.66
• The rejected interpretation runs afoul of other canons of
construction that impose default rules that typically can be
overcome only by clear congressional expression of a contrary intent.67
• The rejected interpretation would overturn Supreme
Court precedent.68
63

Id.

See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 131–32 (2005) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“prolonged” and “lengthy”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (“unusually extensive”).
64

65 See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 282 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“incoherent results”); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 586 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“absurd”).
66 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2007); Dep’t of
Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 340–41 (1999); Clarke v. Sec. Indus.
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 403–07 (1987).
67 See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 381, 392–93 (1976) (canons calling for clear
manifestation to remove Indian tribal immunities and for construction in favor of Indians when
statute is ambiguous).
68 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791–93 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents); Clarke, 479 U.S. at 407 (1987) (“If we
took literally Representative McFadden’s view of § 36(f), we would have to conclude that Congress intended to overturn the Attorney General’s opinion . . . which this Court has previously
approved in First National Bank in St. Louis[ v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924)]”).
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• The rejected interpretation is inconsistent with the statute’s (or amendment’s) purpose or other concerns Congress voiced during the legislative process.69
The difference between the “no mention” and the “silence-is-telling” cases thus is one of degree. The Court is drawing the same basic
inference in both sets of cases—i.e., that Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record about a substantial change worked by
the law means that change was not intended. But in the latter set of
cases, the Court spends more time and space—sometimes considerably more time and space—discussing the lack of legislative debate
about the supposed change. Moreover, as the above list shows, in the
“silence-is-telling” cases the Court often ties its dog that did not bark
argument to other interpretive canons or tools or to specific facts
about the legislative process that leads to the statute’s enactment
which lend support to the inference that Congress’s failure to comment was significant.
C. Bankruptcy Cases
Finally, in a series of bankruptcy decisions, the Supreme Court
has established a bankruptcy-law-specific presumption that Congress
does not intend to make significant changes to pre-Code bankruptcy
practice—unless a statute’s legislative history clearly indicates an intent to make such a change. This Bankruptcy Code version of the dog
that did not bark rule seems to have evolved out of a continuity norm
requiring clear indication of congressional intent before the bankruptcy laws are read to change, or create exemptions from, existing
legal rules. In Midatlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection,70 for example, the Court held that the 1978
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code did not eliminate a preexisting exception to the bankruptcy trustee’s abandonment power.71 Before the
1978 revisions, a bankruptcy “trustee’s abandonment power had been
limited by a judicially developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state or federal interests.”72 The Midatlantic Court held that the
69 See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16–18 (1987) (primary purpose of
tightening restrictions on access to tax information); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 270–71 (1981)
(concern that Department of Interior might not have sufficient funds to make required
payments).
70 Midatlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
71 Id. at 506–07.
72 Id. at 500. Specifically, the Court had held that a bankruptcy trustee who decided to
liquidate the estate of a barge company could not abandon several of the barges if abandonment
would obstruct a navigable passage in violation of federal law. Id.
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Bankruptcy Code must be presumed to incorporate this established
limitation on a trustee’s abandonment power.73 In so doing, it noted
that “[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress
intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this
rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.”74 Although the Midatlantic Court said nothing about whether
Congress made its intent clear in the legislative record, the Court took
the rule in that direction in another bankruptcy case decided in that
same term.
That case, Kelly v. Robinson,75 invoked the continuity norm cited
in Midatlantic, and this time emphasized the lack of comment in the
legislative record as evidence that Congress did not intend to change
pre-Bankruptcy Code practice.76 Robinson raised the question
whether a bankruptcy filing discharges a debtor’s obligations under a
restitution order payable to a state welfare agency.77 Respondent
Robinson had pleaded guilty to the crime of larceny for the wrongful
receipt of welfare benefits from the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance.78 As part of her sentence, she had been ordered
to make restitution payments to the Connecticut Office of Adult Probation.79 The next year, Robinson filed for bankruptcy and sought to
discharge her restitution payments as part of her bankruptcy filing.80
The Court held that Robinson’s restitution obligations were not dischargeable, quoting Midatlantic’s presumption that the Bankruptcy
Code does not work significant changes in surrounding law and noting
that the House and Senate committee reports contained no indication
of congressional intent that bankruptcy filings would void restitution
payments ordered as part of a criminal sentence.81 “If Congress had
intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other provision, to discharge state
criminal sentences, ‘we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so

73

Id. at 501.

74

Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

75

Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).

76

Id. at 49–51.

77

Id. at 38.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 38–39.

80

Id. at 39.

81

Id. at 46–47, 51.
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inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so likely to
arouse public outrage.’”82
Later bankruptcy cases inevitably cite Kelly or Midatlantic when
making dog that did not bark inferences. A typical example is United
Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
Ltd.,83 which held that the Bankruptcy Code does not entitle undersecured creditors to compensation for the delay caused by an automatic stay in foreclosing on their collateral.84 The Court’s opinion
relied primarily on the plain meaning of the statute’s text,85 but it also
noted in passing that the legislative history supported its construction
“since it contains not a hint that [the Code provision] entitles the undersecured creditor to postpetition interest.”86 The Court insisted that
“[s]uch a major change in the existing rules would not likely have
been made without specific provision in the text of the statute; it is
most improbable that it would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history”—citing Kelly v. Robinson.87 Interestingly, the majority opinion in United Savings Association was written
by Justice Scalia, who elsewhere has harshly criticized the Sherlock
Holmes canon!88
While there are many cases in which the Court follows some form
of the Sherlock Holmes canon, there also are a number that expressly
refuse to apply the canon. Still other cases ignore the canon silently,
over dissenting opinions arguing for its application. The leading express-refusal case is Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.89 Harrison involved a provision of the Clean Air Act that was amended to provide
for direct review in the Court of Appeals of certain locally applicable
actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Administrator under specifically enumerated provisions, as well as “any
other final action of the Administrator under [the Act] . . . which is
locally or regionally applicable.”90 The statutory question presented
was whether “any other final action” meant all other final actions
taken by the EPA Administrator or only those “other final actions”
82 Id. at 51 (emphasis added) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
83 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
84 Id. at 382.
85 See id. at 369–76.
86 Id. at 380.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying test.
89 Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980).
90 Id. at 579.
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that were similar to those actions described in the Act’s specifically
enumerated provisions.91 The Supreme Court read the statute
broadly, to include all other final actions and, in the process, criticized
PPG’s attempt to invoke the dog that did not bark canon.92 The Court
stated:
The respondents also rely on what the Committee and the
Congress did not say about the 1977 amendments to
§ 307(b)(1). It is unlikely, the respondents assert, that Congress would have expanded so radically the jurisdiction of
the courts of appeals, and divested the district courts of jurisdiction, without some consideration and discussion of the
matter. We cannot accept this argument. First, although the
number of actions comprehended by a literal interpretation
of ‘any other final action’ is no doubt substantial, the number
would not appear so large as ineluctably to have provoked
comment in Congress. Secondly, it would be a strange canon
of statutory construction that would require Congress to
state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations
that which is obvious on the face of a statute. In ascertaining
the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of
Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not
bark.93
When the Court declines to apply the Sherlock Holmes canon, it
generally argues, as in Harrison, that there was no reason to expect
Congress to comment in the legislative record. The Court’s most common line of argument is that the statute’s meaning is plain and clearly
effects the change at issue, so that legislative comment highlighting
the change is not necessary.94 The Court also sometimes silently declines to apply the Sherlock Holmes canon, ignoring failure to com91

See id. at 586.

92

Id. at 589, 591–92.

93

Id. at 591–92 (second emphasis added).

Another bankruptcy case, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552 (1990), superseded by statute, Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865, as recognized in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 n.4 (1991),
is illustrative. Like Kelly, Davenport concerned the dischargeability of restitution obligations,
but under a different provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 555. This time, however, the
Court did not follow the dog that did not bark rule. The Court did acknowledge the Sherlock
Holmes canon in principle, affirming that “[w]e will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past
bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.” Id. at
563. But it went on to find that in the provision at issue, “the statutory language plainly reveals
Congress’ intent not to except restitution orders from discharge,” and held itself bound by that
plain intent, pre-Code practice notwithstanding. Id.
94
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ment arguments made by dissenting opinions.95 In such cases, as well,
the Court’s reasoning tends to focus on the clarity of the statutory
text, insisting that its meaning is “obvious”96 and “leave[s] no room”
for an alternate construction.97
A second strategy the Court has used to openly reject failure to
comment arguments is to insist that Congress must have been aware
of the change when it enacted the statute or amendment at issue, even
if legislators did not discuss those changes expressly in the legislative
record. For example, in Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury,98 the
Court considered what effect an amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code (“IRC”) should have on certain taxpayers’ eligibility for the
earned income tax credit (“EIC”).99 The Court noted that the “Petitioner and the Government agree that Congress never mentioned the
earned-income credit in enacting” the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (“OBRA”), the statute that amended the IRC.100
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “it defies belief that Congress
was unaware, when it provided in § 6402(c) that ‘any overpayment to
be refunded . . . shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support’ . . . that this would include refunds attributable to excess earnedincome credits.”101 The Court went on to point out that “Congress
had previously expressly defined an excess earned-income credit as an
95 See, e.g., Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S. 280, 311 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 13
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 586–89 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 Harrison, 446 U.S. at 591–92.
97 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 570.
98 Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986).
99 Id. at 852–53. The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) allows an individual responsible for
the support of a child living with him a credit against income taxes (the “earned income tax
credit” or “EIC”). Id. at 854. If the credit exceeds tax liability, the excess is considered an
“overpayment” of tax and the taxpayer is eligible for a refund of the “overpayment.” Id. at
854–55. Section 6402(a) of the IRC provides for a refund of “any overpayment” to the person
who made it. Id. An amendment to the IRC, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (“OBRA”), requires the amount of “any overpayment” to be reduced by the
amount of any past-due child-support payments assigned to a state. Id. at 856–57. The Social
Security Act (“SSA”) directs the Secretary of the Treasury to “intercept” tax refunds payable to
persons who have failed to meet child-support obligations that have been assigned to a state. Id.
Sorenson was entitled to receive an earned income tax credit, but he also was in arrears on child
support payments to his former spouse, who had assigned her rights to child support to the State
of Washington as a condition of receiving public benefits. Id. at 853–54. The statutory interpretation question presented was whether the Treasury Secretary was required to “intercept” Sorenson’s refund (an overpayment under the EIC) and pay it to the State of Washington. Id. at
853.
100 Id. at 863.
101 Id. at 863–64 (first alteration in original) (first emphasis added).
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‘overpayment,’ in § 6401(b) of the Internal Revenue Code—the section immediately preceding the section to which Congress added the
intercept provision.”102 In other words, the Court reasoned that when
amending one provision of the IRC, Congress must have paid attention to adjacent statutory provisions that made clear that the term
“overpayment” applied to the earned income credit. Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion disagreed sharply, finding it significant that “Congress did not even mention this important change at any point in the
legislative history of OBRA.”103 Justice Stevens also pointed out that
OBRA was a “vast” piece of legislation that had been enacted in a
“hurried” fashion and argued that the more logical inference from legislative silence should be that members of Congress did not “realize
that somewhere in that vast piece of hurriedly enacted legislation
there was a provision that changed the 6-year-old Earned Income
Credit Program.”104
A third line of reasoning the Court has used to rebuff the dog
that did not bark canon is that the relevant changes in statutory language must have been made for some reason and must have intended
some new effect, even if there is no discussion in the legislative record
of that change. In Weiss v. United States,105 for example, the Court
reasoned that, “[i]n making the alterations in the phraseology of the
similar section of the earlier act the Congress must have had some
purpose. We cannot conclude that the change in the wording of two of
the four clauses of the section was inadvertent.”106 Thus, despite the
legislative record’s silence, the Court concluded that the Act’s
prohibitions applied to both intrastate and interstate
communications.107
Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Id.
105 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
106 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
107 Id. Weiss raised the question whether the Communications Act of 1934 prohibited the
use in federal court of evidence obtained through federal wiretapping of intrastate communications. See id. at 326. All parties agreed that the Act prohibited the use of evidence obtained
from wiretapping of interstate communications, but the Government argued that the Act should
not be read also to cover intrastate communications, relying in part on the fact that nothing in
the legislative history or the wording of the statute indicated a congressional intent to regulate
intrastate communications. See id. at 326–29. The Government pointed out that the main purpose of the Communications Act was to extend the jurisdiction of the existing Radio Commission to embrace telegraph and telephone communications as well as those by radio. See id. at
328. It argued that “if Congress had intended to make so drastic a change as to regulate intrastate as well as interstate communication, both the legislative history of the Act and its phraseology would so indicate, whereas there is nothing in either to emphasize any such extension of
102
103
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A fourth reason the Court sometimes gives for rejecting Sherlock
Homes canon inferences is that the relevant legal rule is not actually
settled, so that the interpretation at issue would not in fact work a
dramatic change in the law. United Savings Association is again instructive here. Recall that in United Savings Association the Court
held that undersecured creditors are not entitled to compensation for
the delay caused by an automatic stay in foreclosing on their collateral.108 After the Court noted the legislative history’s silence regarding postpetition interest for the period of delay, it went on to reject a
failure to comment argument made by the creditor: The creditor contended that established pre-Code practice gave creditors in his position relief from an automatic stay by permitting them to foreclose, and
insisted that Congress would not have withdrawn this protection without any indication of an intent to do so in the legislative record—
unless it was providing substitute relief in the form of interest on the
collateral during the stay period.109 The Court quickly rebuffed this
dog that did not bark argument on the ground that “it is far from clear
that there was a distinctive . . . [prior] rule of absolute entitlement to
foreclosure.”110
As these examples illustrate, the Court’s overall treatment of
congressional failure to comment or dog that did not bark inferences—whether so labeled or not—has been inconsistent. This Part
has sought to identify some themes in the circumstances that tend to
lead the Court to reject application of the Sherlock Holmes canon—
e.g., a clear text, the use of different language in parallel provisions,
an unsettled status quo—but the Court’s approach to dog that did not
bark inferences remains unpredictable. The next two Parts turn from
the descriptive to the normative, illuminating several theoretical
problems with this under-examined canon and advocating that it be
applied only in certain, very limited, circumstances.
authority.” Id. at 328–29. The Court, however, declined to accept this dog that did not bark
argument. See id. at 329. First, the Court insisted that the text of the Act clearly prohibited
intercepting “any communication” and was not limited to interstate communications. Id. at 327.
The Court then went on to discuss the evolution of the statute, noting that the Communications
Act provision at issue was based on a similar provision of the Radio Act of 1927, which uniformly used the term “communication” or “message”—“and nowhere qualified the designation
by the use of the phrase ‘in interstate or foreign commerce.’ ” Id. at 328. The Communications
Act, by contrast, contained the qualifying phrase “in interstate or foreign commerce” in two of
its four clauses—though not in the clause at issue. Id. at 327–28.
108 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
381–82 (1988); see also supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text
109 Id. at 380.
110 Id. at 381.
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DON’T BARK

As the analysis in Part I shows, the Court is not always persuaded
to reject status-quo-changing interpretations based on Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record. Indeed, many of the dog
that did not bark cases listed in the Appendix invoke the canon in
dissent.111 This means that the Court often does adopt interpretations
that effect significant changes in the law, despite congressional failure
to comment—and despite briefs and opposing opinions pointing out
the lack of legislative debate.112 Further, the Court’s rhetoric regarding the meaning of Congress’s failure to comment is woefully inconsistent from case to case. Many cases invoke the canon and some—like
Church of Scientology and Department of Commerce—place significant weight on it, but several other cases ignore the canon or explicitly
reject it.113
Notably, even when the Justices split internally over whether to
apply the canon, they do not engage in significant discussion or debate
about the canon’s merits. Only Justice Scalia has openly criticized the
canon, and even his criticism has been occasional and inconsistent.114
In fact, he sometimes has quietly gone along with a majority opinion
that cites Congress’s failure to comment as support for a particular
construction.115 Further, the little criticism that Justice Scalia has offered has been cursory and short on political theory, in contrast to his
highly specific and theoretical criticism of other forms of judicial reliance on legislative history.116 This is surprising because the dog that
111 See infra Appendix (showing that thirteen of thirty-one listed cases referenced the canon in dissenting opinions).
112 See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 380.
113 Compare Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 338–41
(1999), and Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17 (1987), with United Sav. Ass’n,
484 U.S. at 380–81.
114 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 120–21 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (refusing to draw inference from congressional silence); Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I also disagree with the Court’s
reliance on things that the sponsors and floor managers of the 1995 amendment failed to say.”);
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting “questionable wisdom of assuming that dogs will bark when something important is happening”).
115 See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137 (2005); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993).
116 In Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), for example, Justice Scalia raises his familiar
objection that courts should not credit the legislative history over the ordinary language of the
statute and then makes a comment about “the questionable wisdom of assuming that dogs will
bark when something important is happening”—citing a book titled The History of Rome!
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1 TITUS LIVIUS, THE HISTORY OF ROME
411–13 (D. Spillan trans., George Bell & Sons 1906) (1892)). This somewhat opaque reference
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did not bark canon is a potentially powerful interpretive trump card—
and one that poses a number of practical and theoretical problems.
First, the canon makes several improbable assumptions about how the
legislative process works. Second, the canon is conceptually loose,
lacking any clear limits or boundaries for defining problematic levels
of change. Moreover, it is somewhat circular in its logic. Third, and
related to the second, the canon provides inadequate notice to legislators about when they need to highlight a change created by a new law
or amendment, and how specific they need to be about such change.
Fourth, the canon sometimes favors statutory constructions that would
treat like entities differently, and thus causes horizontal coherence
problems. Fifth, the canon elevates congressional inaction above duly
enacted statutory text. This Part explores each of these problems in
detail, elaborating on the relatively thin criticism of the canon that has
been articulated thus far.
A. Legislative Process Problems
One significant problem with the Sherlock Holmes canon is that
it rests on unrealistic assumptions about the legislative process. First,
the canon presumes a level of legislative omniscience and detail that is
highly impractical.117 The canon expects members of Congress both to
predict all of the changes that a new law or amendment will effect and
to comment on those changes while enacting the law.118 It does not
account for the fact that legislators confront thousands of bills each
year,119 and cannot pay close attention to more than a few of these;
thus, legislators are unlikely to anticipate all the potential consequences of all the statutes they enact.120 Nor does the canon acknowlto the burning of Rome is a far cry from the detailed political-theory-based critique Justice Scalia
elsewhere has provided to explain his general disdain for judicial reliance on legislative history
or his specific disdain for legislative acquiescence arguments. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional inaction is ambiguous because Constitution was designed to make legislation difficult
to enact).
117 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing effect of changes to deportation
laws on pre-amendment criminal convictions).
119 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 18 (2014); List of Bills Introduced in
the 110th Congress, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Browse.php?n=Bills;c=110
(listing all the bills considered by the 110th Congress in 2007–08).
120 See, e.g., Craig D. Margolis, House Out of Order: Committee Reform in the Modern
House of Representatives, 11 J.L. & POL. 273, 302–03 (1995) (discussing the problem of subcommittee proliferation as a burdensome demand on Members’ time); Hanah Metchis Volokh, A
Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 142–43 (2011) (detailing competing demands on legislators’ time).

R
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edge that legislative staffers, rather than members of Congress, draft
much of the legislative record (e.g., committee reports) and even the
legislation itself.121 Moreover, legislation is sometimes enacted in a
hurry, with little time or opportunity for Members to read, let alone
comment on, all of its intended consequences.122 Thus, even when
members of Congress do anticipate a particular change in the law,
their understanding of the statute’s effect may not be reflected in the
legislative record because they may not take part in preparing the
committee report describing the proposed legislation, or may not be
present when the legislation is debated on the House or Senate floor.
Justice Scalia touched on this problem in his dissenting opinion in
Zuni where he argued that it is nonsensical for a case to turn on
“whether a freshman Congressman from New Mexico gave a floor
speech that only late-night C–SPAN junkies would witness.”123
Second, the dog that did not bark canon misunderstands legislators’ objectives when they do make comments in the legislative record. The legislative process is highly political and tactical, and
121 Two recent empirical studies confirm this. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 967–68 (2013); Victoria F. Nourse &
Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 583 (2002).
122 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 120, at 135–38 (decrying rushed enactment process for the
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as the Waxman-Markey cap-andtrade bill). Volokh excerpted a National Review article that described legislators’ lack of familiarity with the statute’s provisions and effects as follows:
When Waxman-Markey finally hit the floor, there was no actual bill. Not one single copy of the full legislation that would, hours later, be subject to a final vote was
available to members of the House. The text made available to some members of
Congress still had “placeholders”—blank provisions to be filled in by subsequent
language—including one for the regulation of climate derivatives. The last-minute
amendments, too, had yet to be incorporated. Even the House Clerk’s office
lacked a complete copy of the legislation, and was forced to place a copy of the
1,200-page draft side by side with the 300-page amendments.
Jonathan H. Adler, Betting Blind on ACES, NAT’L REV., June 29, 2009, http://www.nationalre
view.com/node/227791/print; see Volokh, supra note 120, at 136. Volokh continued:
Without a copy of the bill to examine, how could the Representatives understand
what they were voting on? All they had to go on were assurances—from party
leaders, from lobbyists for interest groups who had negotiated the bill and amendments, and from staffers who had been frantically reading the parts of the legislation that were available. Even if a Representative had managed to read through all
1,500 pages of text and amendments during the single day before the vote, there
would not have been time to even begin to understand the implications of the proposed law and its interaction with statutes already on the books.
Volokh, supra note 120, at 136.
123 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 121 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

R
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legislators often act or speak with the goal of influencing other legislators or grandstanding to the voting public, rather than recording their
own intent about how a new law will affect prior legal rules.124 It is
not uncommon for legislators who oppose a proposed law or amendment to argue, during floor debates, that the proposed bill will change
the status quo in unfavorable ways—not because they believe this to
be true, but as part of a strategic effort to discourage adoption of the
new law or amendment.125 An uncontroversial change in the status
quo, by contrast, might go unmentioned precisely because everyone
accepts and understands that the proposal will effect the change.
Moreover, an unpopular, but intended, change might receive no comment because legislators wish to avoid highlighting the change to their
constituents. As Victoria Nourse has reminded us, legislators speak
primarily to their constituents and to each other when making statements on the House and Senate floor—and they tend to focus on the
broad goals of the statute they are enacting and the societal needs it
will fulfill, not on chronicling all of the statute’s potential applications
and consequences.126 Even committee reports, which describe proposed legislation section-by-section, are written for members of Congress, to explain the proposed law and help members decide how to
vote—not with the lawyerly objective of describing how a proposed
law will fit into the larger legal landscape.127 When a court reasons
that a particular reading of a statute will change pre-existing law in X
way, and that such change could not have been intended because no
member of Congress noted the change in the legislative record, it is
124 See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1132 (2011)
(“Statutes, like congressional debates, are exercises in communication between representatives
and citizens (the vertical dimension) as much as between legislatures and other government
branches (the horizontal dimension).”).
125 For example, “[d]uring debates on the Violence Against Women Act, opponents
claimed that the bill would cover every act of violence between a man and a woman, leading to
massive numbers of cases brought to federal court.” Id. at 1130–31 (citing FRED STREBEIGH,
EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 309–444 (2009)); see also 158 CONG. REC. H5777
(2012) (statement of Rep. Holt) (charging Government Spending Accountability Act with making “significant changes to Federal employees’ ability to travel to conferences and meetings” that
would hinder American scientists’ ability to communicate and collaborate with other scientists);
144 CONG. REC. 20,339 (1998) (statement of Rep. Markey) (arguing that rider to appropriations
bill allowing helicopter landings in remote Alaskan wilderness areas would work “a significant
change in national wilderness policy”); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 173 (1999) (“[O]pponents often attribute undesirable or highly controversial meaning to language, in order to emphasize the danger of proposed legislation.”).
126

See Nourse, supra note 124, at 1131–33.

R

127

See GREENAWALT, supra note 125, at 173 (chronicling purposes of committee reports).
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expecting Congress to act like a court rather than a legislature—or at
least to pay attention to the kinds of concerns that courts, rather than
legislatures, pay attention to.128
Reconsider, in this light, INS v. St. Cyr, which held that AEDPA
and the IIRIRA did not repeal the Attorney General’s power to grant
discretionary relief from deportation to an alien who was convicted of
a crime before those statutes took effect.129 The legislative history of
both statutes is rife with broad statements extolling the proposed bills
for taking a hard stance against illegal immigrants and immigrants
who commit crimes while in the United States.130 Congress either did
not think about how AEDPA and the IIRIRA would affect immigrants convicted of crimes before these statutes took effect or, if it did,
did not discuss this in the legislative history—perhaps because it was
more concerned with grandstanding and persuading fellow legislators
than with explaining the details of how these laws would operate in
interim cases.131 Members of Congress were not directing their comments in the Congressional Record at judges or lawyers, or focusing
on questions of legal procedure; rather, they were busy taking credit
for addressing important societal problems.132
A third problem with the dog that did not bark canon is that it
could have the paradoxical effect of counteracting congressional intent
by limiting the scope of new statutes or amendments. The whole point
of statutory amendments and new laws is to effect some change in the
status quo—if Congress wished for everything to remain the same, it
128

See Nourse, supra note 124, at 1131–33.

129

See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).

R

130 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 23,251 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson) (praising IIRIRA
because it would “ensure that aliens who commit serious crimes are detained upon their release
from prison until they can be deported, and then they will be deported under expedited procedures,” would “strengthen the border enforcement,” would “create an expedited removal process” for “those who seek to enter the United States surreptitiously,” and would “ensure that the
sponsor and not the U.S. taxpayer will be primarily responsible for providing financial support to
new immigrants in need”); 142 CONG. REC. 7970 (1996) (statement of Rep. Poshard) (praising
AEDPA for providing “a meaningful response to the threat of terrorism” by, among other
things, including a provisions that “will allow deportation of immigrants who are or may be
engaged in terrorist activity”); 142 CONG. REC. 7954 (1996) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (listing as
one of AEDPA’s virtues: “improved procedures for deporting criminal aliens are included which
allow judges to order the deportation of aliens convicted of Federal crimes at the completion of
their sentence”).
131

See supra notes 124–25.

E.g., 142 CONG. REC. 7954 (1996) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (touting the “long overdue
victory” of instating “mandatory victim restitution” and ending the suffering of victims “at the
hands of . . . an inadequate, insensitive, inattentive justice system”).
132
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would not go through the difficult process of enacting a new law.133
The only question, then, is how much change Congress intends for a
new statute or amendment to effect. The Sherlock Holmes canon imposes a default rule that, when in doubt, Congress should be presumed not to have intended significant changes in the law—unless
there is specific discussion of a change in the legislative record. For
the reasons described above, however, Congress may not necessarily
discuss in the legislative record all changes that it intends or understands a new law to effect.134 The Sherlock Holmes canon thus could
have the unintended consequence of straight-jacketing new laws and
amendments by limiting their reach to the narrow set of circumstances
explicitly—and perhaps somewhat arbitrarily—discussed in the legislative history.
An example may help to illustrate. Consider Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc.,135 which involved a provision of the Jones Act that
required certain maritime vessel owners to pay seamen promptly upon
their discharge and authorized seamen to recover double wages for
each day that payment was delayed without cause.136 An earlier version of the statute had given judges discretion to award payment of up
to two times the seamen’s daily wages for a maximum of ten days;
later amendments had replaced the discretionary language with a requirement that vessel owners “shall pay” seamen two days’ pay “for
each and every day” during which payment is delayed.137 Griffin was
133 McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 3, 23 (1994). It is no secret that the legislative process is
filled with numerous “veto-gates,” or “negative legislative checkpoints,” that make it exceptionally difficult for proposed legislation to become law. See, e.g., id. at 6–7; Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 408 n.137 (1992) (defining “negative legislative checkpoints” as “the various loci at which an individual legislator or a
group of legislators representing minority interests can slow down or stop a bill or, alternatively,
at which minority interests can focus their lobbying efforts to procure legislative benefits”). Indeed, during the past ten years (the 109th to 113th Congresses), no more than four percent of the
bills introduced in any given Congress have been enacted into law. See Bills by Final Status,
GOVTRACK.US https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (table
listing numbers and percentages of proposed legislation, resolutions, and enacted laws); Josh
Tauberer, Kill Bill: How Many Bills Are There? How Many Are Enacted?, GOVTRACK.US (Aug.
4, 2011), http://www.govtrack.us/blog/2011/08/04/kill-bill-how-many-bills-are-there-how-manyare-enacted/ (noting that the 111th Congress enacted only three percent of legislation
introduced).
134 E.g., McNollgast, supra note 133, at 23 (“Rational actors would not expend effort and
resources to enact vacuous legislation that does not affect the status quo. Hence, the status quo
is certain not to be the intent of the legislation.”).
135 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
136 Id. at 565–66.
137 See id. at 572–74.
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a seamen whose employer failed to pay him some $412.50 for more
than four years after he was discharged; based on the double wages
provision, this subjected the employer to over $300,000 in penalty
damages.138 The Supreme Court held that the statutory language was
clear and that the vessel owner must pay the full amount.139 But a
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens would have allowed the district
court discretion to limit the damages period, relying in part on the fact
that the amendment’s legislative history said nothing about the “drastic and dramatic” change of removing all judicial discretion over the
damages amount.140 This reading, by the strongly intentionalist Justice
Stevens, was potentially quite subversive of congressional intent. The
evidence indicated that Congress’s purpose in amending the damages
provision was “to secure prompt payment of seamen’s wages” and to
protect seamen from “arbitrary and unscrupulous action” by their employers through “the imposition of a liability which is not exclusively
compensatory, but designed to prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages.”141 Yet the default rule imposed by the
Sherlock Holmes canon—that courts should retain discretion to reduce a damages award absent explicit mention in the legislative record
of an intent to eliminate judicial discretion—would have severely limited the protections for seamen afforded by the amendment and provided significantly less encouragement to employers to pay seamen
promptly. Accordingly, application of the canon very possibly would
have led the Court to a result that flew in the face of Congress’s metaintent.
Finally, the dog that did not bark canon could create perverse
incentives in the Court-Congress dialogue. If the Court were to endorse the canon full-throatedly, it would send an odd signal to members of Congress. On the one hand, full-throated adoption of the
canon could encourage legislators to plant strategic statements in the
legislative record describing changes in legal rules that they wish to
see effected. Conversely, the canon could create perverse incentives
for members of Congress to stay silent about potential changes in a
legal rule that they do not like, for fear that any legislative discussion
will later be taken as a sign that the change was intended. These are
not problems with the manner in which the canon operates but,
138

See id. at 567, 574–75.

139

Id. at 574–77.

140

Id. at 588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

141

Id. at 572 (majority opinion) (quoting Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1930)).
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rather, dangerous collateral consequences that the canon could
encourage.
B. Circularity and Looseness
In addition to legislative process problems, the Sherlock Holmes
canon also suffers from problems of logic. First, the logical inference
drawn by the canon is circular. The canon operates in two steps: First,
the Court declares that a particular statutory interpretation would effect a massive change in the legal status quo. Next, it declares that if
Congress intended such a significant legal change, it would have commented on that change in the legislative record. There is a lot of rhetorical looseness and ipse-dixitism to this kind of argument. The
Court is basically announcing that, “X interpretation creates an enormous change!” and insisting that, “if Congress intended such enormous change, it would have said so in the legislative history!” But we
have to take the Court’s word for both of these propositions; the
change is enormous because the Court says it is, and Congress would
have commented on such enormous change because the Court declares it to be so. To be sure, the Court sometimes provides additional
reasons why Congress should be expected to comment on a particular
change—e.g., inconsistency with the statute’s purpose, another substantive canon that calls for explicit mention of the kind of change at
issue, absurd results that would follow from the change.142 But such
supporting factors are not present in all cases, and even when they
are, we still have to take the Court’s word that a particular change is
significant or “enormous.”
Worse yet, the Court does not have to follow any guidelines when
declaring a legal change to be so significant as to require congressional
comment. The canon does not establish, nor does it require the Court
to follow, any standards regarding how much change a new law or
statute can accomplish without specific comment in the legislative record. After all, what constitutes enormous, versus ordinary—or average—change? Are all changes forbidden unless specifically
commented upon? (Note that this would severely hamper the effectiveness of new laws.) If not, where does the line fall separating acceptable changes from changes that require express legislative
discussion? Without any such standards, judges are left to use their
own intuitions to guide them in deciding whether a particular legal
change goes too far to be implemented without express evidence of
142

See supra Part I.B.
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legislative intent—and the canon lacks any limiting features. The canon thus suffers from problems of looseness as well as circularity.
The Sherlock Homes canon also makes several logical leaps.
Most prominently, the canon takes for granted that members of Congress necessarily will comment in the legislative record when they intend for a new law to effect significant changes in the legal status quo.
But there are many reasons why Congress might fail to comment on
an intended change in the law. For example, Congress could intend a
particular change, but not consider it as large or significant a change
as the Court does—and therefore may not consider it necessary to
highlight the change during the process of enactment. This kind of
mismatch between Congress’s and the Court’s views of a particular
change could result because: (1) Congress underestimates the extent
of change worked by the statute; (2) the Court overestimates the extent of change worked by the statute; or (3) Congress holds a different
view of the baseline, current state of the law than does the Court. All
of this, of course, assumes that members of Congress are even paying
attention to the statute at more than a cursory level.143
Alternately, Congress might not comment on a change that it intends for a statute to produce because it fails to foresee the precise
statutory application that later arises, although that application may
be a natural consequence of Congress’s broader meta-intent in enacting the statute—and one that it would have approved if it had anticipated the application. Finally, Congress might see no need to
highlight a particular change in the legislative record because it believes the statutory language to clearly require the change. Justice
Scalia has made this point when criticizing the Sherlock Holmes canon, arguing that “[t]he only fair inference from Congress’s silence is
that Congress had nothing further to say, its statutory text doing all of
the talking.”144 This explanation is particularly plausible because, as
Part I shows, the Supreme Court has applied the dog that did not bark
canon in an utterly inconsistent manner—sending conflicting
messages to Congress about the necessity of highlighting intended
changes to the status quo in the legislative history.145 The next Section
discusses this signaling problem in greater detail.

See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 121 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
145 See supra Part I.
143
144
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C. Notice Problems
A further problem with the Sherlock Holmes canon is that it provides inadequate notice to Congress about what it must say and do
when it does intend to make significant changes in the status quo. The
canon is not invoked with great frequency and, when invoked, has
been rejected by a majority of the Court in several cases.146 On the
other hand, the canon seems to have gained in popularity over the last
thirty or so years.147 This puts Congress on uncertain ground, as the
Court essentially lulls Congress into believing that it is enough to state
a statute’s effect clearly in the statute’s text—but then upsets this expectation with sporadic cases declaring that a statute cannot apply to a
situation seemingly covered by its text because such application would
work a significant change in the law, about which there was no legislative discussion.148
Perhaps more troubling than the Court’s inconsistency, however,
is the post hoc nature of the requirement that the canon places on
Congress. Administrative lawyers and courts long have recognized a
“Monday morning quarterbacking” problem that occurs when courts
review an agency’s rulemaking process years after the fact and decide
that there was something lacking in that process.149 Agencies have
little way of predicting which aspects of their rulemaking process a
court might find fault with, especially since the court will be making its
decision after several years of lived experience under the legal rule at
issue, and with the benefit of hindsight and a record that the agency
did not have before it when it made the rule.150 A similar problem
plagues the dog that did not bark canon. With statutes as well as
agency rulemakings, courts often revisit the process of enactment
years after Congress has acted.151 Like agencies, members of Congress have little way of predicting which changes worked by a statute—and all statutes work some changes in the status quo—a court
146 See infra Appendix (listing thirty-one cases, including thirteen in which a failure to comment argument was invoked in dissent).
147 See infra Appendix (listing cases referencing congressional failure to comment, only
four out of thirty-one of which were decided before 1980).
148 See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 90–91; Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509
U.S. 155, 176–77 (1993).
149 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547
(1978); FLORENCE A. HEFFRON & NEIL MCFEELEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS 314 (1983).
150 See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 547.
151 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (interpreting
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 twenty-one years after its passage).
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will later find to be substantial and discount in the absence of specific
legislative comment.
Consider two examples from the Court’s recent history. In Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel.
Wilson,152 the Court evaluated the scope of the False Claim Act’s
“public disclosure” bar, which deprives courts of jurisdiction over qui
tam suits when relevant information has already entered the public
domain through disclosure in “a congressional, administrative, or
General Accounting Office (GAO) report, hearing, audit or investigation.”153 The statutory question was whether the term “administrative” applied to state and local administrative reports, hearings,
audits, and investigations, or only to federal ones.154 Justice
Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion argued that the bar should apply only
to federal administrative reports, because that had been the prior
practice and there was no discussion in the legislative history about
expanding the bar to cover state reports as well.155 The majority opinion stressed that the statute’s language did not limit itself to federal
administrative reports and held that state reports therefore also
should be included.156
Assume for a moment that Congress intended for the bar to apply to all disclosures in all government reports, both state and federal.
Under the dissent’s reasoning, how were members of Congress to
know that they needed to discuss the inclusion of state administrative
reports in the legislative history? Legislators very reasonably could
have believed that the statutory text, which plainly lists “administrative . . . report[s], hearing[s], audit[s,] or investigation[s]” without any
limiting adjectives, was enough.157 Even if the Court’s recent affinity
for invoking the Sherlock Holmes canon can be said to have provided
some constructive notice that the Court would consult the legislative
history for evidence of an intent to effect significant changes in the
status quo, such notice is of little help for statutes like the False Claims

152 Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S.
280 (2010).
153 Id. at 286 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 303, 311 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 287 (majority opinion).
157 Id at 286 (quoting § 3730(e)(4)(A)).
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Act, which was enacted in 1863 and amended in 1986158—well before
the Court’s recent surge in dog that did not bark references.159
Similarly, in United States v. Ressam,160 the Court considered
whether a sentencing enhancement applicable when a defendant “carries an explosive during the commission of any felony” should be applied to a defendant who made false statements about his identity to
U.S. Customs officials (a felony) while carrying explosives in the trunk
of his car.161 Ressam argued that the sentencing enhancement should
not apply because he had not carried explosives during and in relation
to the crime of making of false statements.162 The Court disagreed,163
despite a vigorous dissenting opinion that invoked the dog that did not
bark canon.164 The canon came into play because the explosives statute was modeled on a firearms enhancement statute and originally
contained the same language as that statute.165 Both statutes later
were amended; the amendments to the firearms statutes added the
words “and in relation to” immediately after the word “during,” but
the amendments to the explosives statute did not do so.166 The dissenting opinion argued that “[i]f Congress, in neglecting to add the
words ‘in relation to,’ sought to create a meaningful distinction between the explosives and firearms statutes, one would think that
someone somewhere would have mentioned this objective.”167 The
majority opinion rejected this argument, concluding that the differences in the statute’s language must reflect differences in legislative
intent.168
Again, assume that Congress intended for the explosives enhancement to apply whenever a defendant carries an explosive while
committing a felony, and did not want the “in relation to” limitation in
the firearms statute to carry over to the explosives statute. How were
members of Congress supposed to be on notice that they should have
discussed, in the legislative history of the explosives statute, their unSee id. at 298 (discussing 1986 amendments to the FCA).
Seventeen of the Justices’ thirty-one invocations of the canon were made in opinions
written after the year 1990. See infra Appendix.
160 United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272 (2008).
161 Id. at 273–74 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) (1994)).
162 Id. at 273.
163 Id. at 274 (“The most natural reading of the relevant statutory text provides a sufficient
basis for reversal [of the lower court’s ruling in favor of Ressam].”).
164 Id. at 281–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 275 (majority opinion).
166 Id. at 275–77.
167 Id. at 282 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 277 (majority opinion).
158
159
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derstanding that that statute should be treated differently from the
firearms statute? Again, legislators might reasonably have believed
that the disparate language of the two statutes spoke for itself. Moreover, it is somewhat odd to expect Congress to explain, in the legislative history of one statute, why it did not include a qualifying phrase
contained in another, separate statute. If Congress were going to explain its failure to replicate one particular qualifying phrase contained
in one analogous statute, then why not also explain its reasons for not
including other qualifications drawn from other analogous statutes?
There is no logical end to this requirement, and thus no way for Congress to predict how specific the Court, construing statutes with the
benefit of hindsight, will expect it to be.
D. Horizontal Coherence Problems
A fourth problem with the dog that did not bark canon is that it
can be used to create exceptions from a general rule for one particular
category of people or institutions affected by a statute. That is, the
canon can be employed in a manner that treats like entities disparately. Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, discussed in Part I, provides a good example.169 Recall that Sorenson raised the question
whether a provision of OBRA (the omnibus budget statute) requiring
the IRS to “intercept” refunds owed to taxpayers who are delinquent
on their child support payments applied to refunds due under the EIC
(the earned income tax credit).170 Recall also that Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion invoked the dog that did not bark canon to argue
against presuming that Congress intended for the child support intercept provision to undo the EIC.171 Justice Stevens’ Sherlock Holmes
reading would have treated EIC recipients differently from all other
taxpayers, giving them a break that other taxpayers with unfulfilled
child support payments do not receive.172 Moreover, that reading
would have applied OBRA unevenly to similar situations, directing
the IRS to withhold refunds owed to some child support avoiders but
not those owed to others.173
169

Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986); see also supra Part I.C.

See supra note 99. As discussed, the budget statute, OBRA, only intercepts refunds if
the child support payments have been assigned to the state (which happens, for example, when
the child owed support goes on public assistance). Id.

R

171 Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.

R

170

172

See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 860, 867.

173

Id. at 862, 867.
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Such disparate treatment raises a horizontal coherence problem,
and violates the generality principle. In the statutory interpretation
context, horizontal coherence refers to efforts to ensure that the
meaning given to one statutory provision is consistent with the whole
statute in which the provision is found, with analogous statutory texts
and their current judicial interpretations, and with other parts of the
legal framework, including canons of statutory construction.174 Horizontal coherence is highly concerned with treating like situations and
entities consistently.175 The Sherlock Homes canon, by contrast, is
concerned almost entirely with vertical coherence—that is, with treating a particular group or entity consistently across time.176 But in arguing that certain applications of a statute go too far to implement
without specific legislative comment, the canon perhaps unwittingly
opens the door to judicial privileging of certain groups over other similarly situated groups. This in turn violates the generality principle,
which dictates that a nation’s civil and criminal laws should be applied
equally to all of its citizens.177 The generality principle has been described as a crucial safeguard against abuse and arbitrariness in a constitutionally limited government,178 and political scientists have argued
that it helps prevent rent-seeking by special interests.179 Failure to follow the principle, scholars have warned, would result in a government
of men, rather than of laws—in which citizens are ruled by the will of
government officials rather than by neutral principles.180 There is a
real danger that the Sherlock Holmes canon, in allowing judges to
carve out exceptions for statutory applications they believe work “too
much” change in the law, empowers judges to favor those interests
174 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 2, at 678. Horizontal coherence is often associated with
the textualist methodology of statutory interpretation. See id.; Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 547 n.81
(1992).
175 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 239
(1994) (noting that, under horizontal coherence, the “interpreter demonstrates that her interpretation is coherent with authorities or norms located in the present: the statute’s contemporary
purposes, other statutes now in effect and their statutory policies, and current values”).
176 See, e.g., id. (noting that, under vertical coherence, “the interpreter demonstrates that
her interpretation is coherent with authoritative sources situated in the past: the original intent
of the enacting legislature, previous administrative or judicial precedents interpreting the statute,
and traditional or customary norms”).
177

See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION

178

Id.

179

See id. at 154 (recognizing that certain laws will sometimes “privilege” certain classes of

people).
180

See id. at 153.

OF

LIBERTY 153 (1960).

R
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that they like or are sympathetic to—in precisely the manner scholars
have feared.
A related problem is that the canon’s status quo bias almost inevitably tends to favor powerful, well-organized groups—as these are
the groups most likely to be benefited by status quo legal rules. Recall Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., the maritime damages case.181
Notably, the statute at issue in Griffin was revised several times, each
time increasing the severity of the penalty imposed on employers and
making the law more favorable to seamen.182 The dissent’s dog that
did not bark reading, however, would have limited the scope of the
then-most recent Jones Act amendment, preserving judicial discretion
to reduce damages awards below the statutorily-prescribed amount.183
That limitation would have benefitted vessel-owning employers—a
wealthy, powerful group—over seamen who, as a class, tend to be significantly poorer and to possess less political clout.184 This seems exactly backwards. Indeed, one might argue that any interpretive
presumption should push in the opposite direction, towards benefitting the politically weaker litigant, or at least towards treating all citizens the same.185
E. Formalist Concerns
There are several formal problems with inferring statutory meaning from Congress’s failure to say something in the legislative record.
Many of these problems have been elaborated in detail as part of the
general textualist critique against judicial reliance on legislative history, so I will provide only a summary here. Fundamentally, formalism stresses that federal statutes derive their authority from the
detailed procedural requirements that must be followed to enact
them.186 Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution provides that
proposed bills must be adopted by both chambers of Congress, in
identical form, and signed by the President in order to become law.187
These are known as the bicameralism and presentment requireGriffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982); see also supra Part II.A.
Griffin, 458 U.S. at 572–74.
183 See id. at 584–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 See id. at 572 (majority opinion) (noting statutory purpose “to protect [seamen] from
the harsh consequences of arbitrary and unscrupulous action of their employers, to which, as a
class, they are peculiarly exposed” (quoting Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 55 (1930)).
185 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 153, 158–59; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471–73, 486–87 (1989).
186 See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2027–28 (2006).
187 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
181
182

R
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ments.188 Legislative history, which is neither voted upon by Congress
nor presented to the President for his signature, fails to meet these
constitutional requirements and thus, in the formalist view, cannot be
authoritative.189 In addition to procedural objections, formalism also
takes issue with legislative history on the ground that such history reflects the comments and views of only one legislator, or at best a subset of legislators—not of the entire House or the entire Senate, let
alone both houses of Congress and the President together, as the Constitution requires.190 Indeed, some legislative history does not reflect
the views of legislators at all, but only those of congressional staff or
lobbyists.191
These basic formalist problems are heightened when courts invoke the dog that did not bark canon. If statements made in the legislative record during enactment of a statute—that directly support a
statutory reading—are not valid interpretive aids, then how can ConSee INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–47, 948 (1983).
See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 68 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Congress conveys its directions in the Statutes at Large, not in excerpts from the Congressional Record.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that enacted text always trumps “unenacted legislative intent”); Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“We are governed by
laws, not by the intentions of legislators. . . . ‘The law as it passed is the will of the majority of
both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself.’ ” (quoting Aldridge
v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845))); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure
in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68-69 (1994) (“No matter how well
we can know the wishes and desires of legislators, the only way the legislature issues binding
commands is to embed them in a law.”); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 695 (1997).
190 See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent to a small
band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an intent of the Congress. There is
no escaping the point: Legislative history that does not represent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (“What motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it.”).
191 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (charging
that committee reports are often drafted by staff members at their own initiative or at the suggestion of lawyer-lobbyists); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“[L]egislative history is a poor guide to legislators’ intent because it is written by the staff rather
than members of Congress . . . .”); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 220, 222 (identifying
opportunities for strategic behavior on part of both legislators and “nonlegislator drafters”); W.
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule
of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 397 (1992) (noting that members of Congress “manufacture”
legislative history); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1302–03 (1990)
(discussing claim that committee staff write biased legislative history).
188
189
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gress’s failure to comment in the legislative record be entitled to any
interpretive weight? When courts rely on statements in the legislative
record as evidence of statutory meaning, there is at least some room
for argument that those statements reflect the understanding held by
legislators who voted for the law—an implicit approval or agreement
about the statute’s meaning that is based on other legislators’ awareness, or constructive awareness, of statements made in the legislative
record.192 By contrast, when members of Congress fail to comment in
the legislative record, there is no legislative process convention that
holds other legislators to any understanding. Nor is there any “meeting of the minds” of the kind required by the bicameralism and presentment clauses. Thus taking Congress’s failure to comment on a
supposed change in the law as evidence of collective agreement or
intent not to change the law is an extraordinary inference.
Worse still from a formalist perspective, the Court sometimes
draws inferences from Congress’s failure to comment that contradict
the statute’s plain language. Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in
United States v. Gonzales193 is illustrative. Gonzales involved the interpretation of a federal firearms enhancement statute that imposes a
mandatory five-year sentence enhancement upon persons who carry
or use a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and directs that
the enhancement may not be imposed concurrently with “any other
term of imprisonment.”194 The question before the Court was
whether the bar against concurrent sentences applies to state
sentences, or is limited to federal sentences.195 The language of the
enhancement statute is broad, and in no way confines the ban against
concurrent sentences to federal sentences,196 but Justice Stevens invoked the dog that did not bark canon to argue that the evolution of
the statutory provision suggested a lack of congressional intention to
apply the ban to state sentences.197 To formalists, such reasoning borders on blasphemy. The text of the statute plainly sweeps in all
192 See Bank One Chicago, 516 U.S. at 276 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Legislators, like other
busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official
responsibilities.”).
193 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997).
194 Id. at 2–3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012)).
195 Id. at 3–4.
196 See id. at 3.
197 Id. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The provision prohibiting concurrent sentences was
adopted in 1970 and initially applied only to the federal sentence imposed for the underlying
offense. Id. “When Congress amended the statute in 1984 to broaden the prohibition beyond
the underlying offense,” by adding the words “other term of imprisonment,” “it said nothing
about state sentences.” Id. Justice Stevens argued that, “if Congress had intended the amend-
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“other” terms of imprisonment, including state sentences.198 To read
it otherwise, based on an absence of commentary expressing congressional intent to include one specific application, contravenes both constitutional requirements and common sense.199
Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia has raised formalist objections to
the Sherlock Holmes canon in two recent cases, although he has done
so without elaborating the theoretical underpinnings for his criticism.
In Zuni Public School District No. 89, for example, Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion criticized the majority200 for relying on the fact that
“no Member of Congress” had commented on the change seemingly
worked by the amendment at issue.201 “It is bad enough for this Court
to consider legislative materials beyond the statutory text in aid of
resolving ambiguity,” Justice Scalia argued, “but it is truly unreasonable to require such extratextual evidence as a precondition for enforcing an unambiguous congressional mandate.”202 Similarly, in his
dissenting opinion in Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh,203 Justice Scalia objected that “[t]he Canon of Canine Silence that the Court
invokes today introduces a reverse—and at least equally dangerous—
phenomenon, under which courts may refuse to believe Congress’s
own words [the text] unless they can see the lips of others moving in
unison.”204
Justice Scalia’s hand-wringing aside, only a handful of cases have
involved judicial use of the Sherlock Holmes canon to contradict
broad statutory language that unambiguously seems to cover the situation at issue.205 Moreover, most such invocations have occurred in
dissenting opinions, perhaps providing some comfort to formalists that
ment to apply to state as well as federal sentences, I think there would have been some mention
of this important change in the legislative history.” Id.
198 Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
199 See id. at 10 (“Given this clear legislative directive, it is not for the courts to carve out
statutory exceptions based on judicial perceptions of good sentencing policy.”).
200 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 120–21 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
201 Id. at 90–91 (majority opinion).
202 Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203 Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).
204 Id. at 73–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 See United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 281–82 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Zuni
Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 100 (“The upshot is that the language of the statute is broad enough
to permit the Secretary’s reading. That fact requires us to look beyond the language to determine whether the Secretary’s interpretation is a reasonable, hence permissible, implementation
of the statute. . . . [W]e conclude that the Secretary’s reading is a reasonable reading.”); Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 586 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the most egregious form of the canon has been unsuccessful in persuading a majority of the Court most of the time.206 Of course for
formalists, the dog that did not bark canon remains problematic even
when applied to unclear statutory language—both because the canon
goes beyond the four corners of the duly-enacted text and because it
imputes meaning to the absence of action.
In light of the above theoretical and practical problems, inferences based on legislative silence seem suspect if courts mean them
literally—that is, to convey a concrete conviction that Congress could
not have intended to make a substantial change in the law without
noting so in the legislative record. The next Part posits that this is not,
at bottom, how the Supreme Court employs the Sherlock Holmes canon, and evaluates the normative implications of the Court’s actual
use of this interpretive presumption.
III. A CLEAR STATEMENT RULE

IN

DISGUISE

For the reasons elaborated in Part II, I believe that Congress’s
failure to comment in the legislative record reveals very little about
actual congressional intent regarding substantial changes in the law. If
this skepticism is on target, then what is behind the numerous Supreme Court cases that infer meaning from congressional failure to
comment? Indeed, why does the Supreme Court seem increasingly
inclined to invoke the Sherlock Holmes canon in recent years, with
most of its references occurring since 1980?207 This Article argues that
the answer lies in this hidden interpretive reality: Despite the Court’s
rhetoric about legislative intent, its references to the dog that did not
bark are not actually about Congress’s expectations regarding a particular change in the law; rather, they are about institutional burdenshifting—i.e., a judicial attempt to impose a default rule on Congress.
That is, when the Court invokes the Sherlock Holmes canon, it effectively creates a clear statement rule that guards against legal changes
and protects the status quo. The canon thus makes more sense if
viewed not as a guide that aids judges in uncovering legislative intent,
but as a tool that judges employ to place the institutional burden on
Congress to identify significant changes effected by a new law.
Clear statement rules are a common interpretive device.208 During the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, they typically have been inSee supra note 205.
See infra Appendix.
208 Three prominent forms of clear statement rules include: federalism rules (which presume that, “absent a clear statement to the contrary, acts of Congress do not intrude upon the
206
207

R
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voked to protect background norms dictated by the Constitution, such
as federalism or state sovereign immunity.209 I believe that there are
normative problems with using such rules in the manner that the Sherlock Holmes canon does—i.e., to protect a status quo legal rule that
reflects a policy choice made by the legislature at one point in time,
rather than a fundamental, enduring constitutional principle.210 Accordingly, this Article argues that the canon should be applied in a far
more limited fashion than it has been in the past. This Part first explores the clear statement effect of the Sherlock Holmes canon and its
strong normative edge. It then suggests a more limited application of
the dog that did not bark canon that accounts for the canon’s theoretical and practical limitations.
A. Reconsidering the Sherlock Holmes Canon: Continuity and
Institutional Burden
The rhetoric of the dog that did not bark cases typically sounds in
legislative intent—insisting that Congress would not mutely effect a
dramatic change in the law.211 But on closer examination, the Court in
these cases seems far less concerned with discerning Congress’s intent
than it does with preserving continuity and the status quo legal rule.
The emphasis in the cases always is on the extent of legal change that
a proposed interpretation would effect.212 Congressional intent comes
only second, as a logical inference or corollary that follows from the
sheer enormity of the change that otherwise would be effected and
from an assumed institutional practice of highlighting significant legal
changes in the legislative record. Legislative intent is presumed,
states by regulating state functions or displacing state law”), retroactivity rules (which presume
“that Congress intends to impose new liability prospectively unless the statute clearly indicates
the contrary”), and the presumption of reviewability of agency action (which “presumes that
judicial review of agency action is available, unless there is ‘clear and convincing’ evidence of a
legislative intent to preclude such review”). See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the
Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 407, 410, 412 (2010).
209 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611–12 (1992).
210 There are also institutional problems, and even perhaps constitutional problems, with
many traditional clear statement rules. See Manning, supra note 208, at 427–28. But imposing a
clear statement presumption against legal change is even more problematic, in my view.
211 See, e.g., Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137 (2005); Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 490 (1985).
212 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2796 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2696–97 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 342–43 (1999); Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176 (1993).
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rather than discovered, and it is presumed because continuity in the
law and a legislative duty to acknowledge change are presumed.
One reading of the dog that did not bark cases, then, is that unless Congress takes the unusual step of expressly noting a particular
kind of legal change in the legislative history of a statute, courts are
free to read the resulting statute or amendment narrowly, to effect as
little change in the legal scheme as they deem acceptable. That is,
absent some extraordinarily specific congressional discussion noting
that a particular consequence was intended to be covered by a new
law, courts may limit the reach of the new law if they deem the contemplated application to depart too much from the status quo.
In this sense, the Sherlock Holmes canon operates like a clear
statement rule, dictating that X (status quo ante) is the established,
background legal norm and that if Congress intends to contradict that
norm, it must state so clearly in the legislative record or be presumed
not to intend the change.213 This reading of the dog that did not bark
canon is consistent with the rhetoric of the cases. For example, the
Court sometimes states the canon as follows: “For over 100 years
debtors’ attorneys have been considered by Congress and the courts
to be an integral part of the bankruptcy process. It is fair to doubt
that Congress would so rework their longstanding role without announcing the change in the congressional record.”214 Courts will also
sometimes state:
[T]his [previous] prohibition applied only to the federal sentence imposed for the underlying offense. When Congress
amended the statute . . . it said nothing about state sentences;
if Congress had intended the amendment to apply to state as
well as federal sentences, I think there would have been
some mention of this important change in the legislative
history.215
If the Sherlock Holmes canon is effectively a clear statement rule,
based on a presumed institutional practice or responsibility to highlight significant legal changes in the legislative record, what is the
source of that responsibility? Its apparent basis seems to be our legal
system’s preference for continuity in the law. Continuity in legal rules
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1376 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (observing that clear statement rules “constitute conditions on the effectual exercise
of legislative power” and “promote objectives of the legal system which transcend the wishes of
any particular session of the legislature”).
214 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 539 (2004) (citation omitted).
215 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 13 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213

IN THE
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is favored for a number of reasons. Among other benefits, continuity
promotes predictability, which lends legitimacy to the law as a stable
set of rules that do not change frequently.216 A presumption of continuity also protects the reliance interests of private individuals and
public decisionmakers who have structured their behavior around existing legal rules, by guarding against sudden shifts in the law and requiring notice before legal rules change.217 In addition, a continuity
presumption can help ensure that the legislature deliberates before
adopting significant legal changes.218 The principle of stare decisis is
based on the need for continuity, and many canons of statutory construction seek to preserve continuity.219 Indeed, David Shapiro has
gone so far as to argue that “the dominant theme running through
most interpretive guides . . . is that close questions of construction
should be resolved in favor of continuity and against change.”220 Shapiro defined continuity canons as “those that emphasize the importance of not changing existing understandings any more than is
needed to implement the statutory objective” and included within his
list such canons as: inclusio unius est exclusio alterius and ejusdem
generis, the maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed, the rule of lenity, the presumption
against implied repeals, and most clear statement rules.221
But the Sherlock Holmes canon is not just an ordinary continuity
canon. Continuity canons typically impose presumptions that favor
legal consistency and tip the scales in favor of the status quo in close
cases.222 The dog that did not bark canon goes further than this, in
that it not only presumes in favor of the status quo, but also imposes
on Congress the institutional burden, or duty, to comment on any intended legal changes in the legislative record in order for those
changes to become effective. In addition, while other continuity canons and presumptions can be rebutted by traditional tools of statutory construction, including statutory text,223 the dog that did not bark
canon expects—and in effect requires—that Congress make statements in the legislative history in order to effect significant legal
change. Compare, for example, the “elephants in mouseholes” canon,
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 943–45.
See id. at 943–44.
See id. at 944.
See id. at 925.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 943.
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209, at 597.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\84-1\GWN101.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 43

THE SHERLOCK HOLMES CANON

4-FEB-16

11:06

43

which presumes that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details
of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions”—i.e.,
that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”224 This canon
is a close cousin of the dog that did not bark canon, as both canons
require legislative clarity in order to effect significant, “elephantsized,” changes in the legal regime.225 But while the elephants in
mouseholes canon looks for that clarity in the statutory text, emphasizing that Congress must express any intended change unambiguously and in the operative, rather than subsidiary, provisions of the
statute, the dog that did not bark canon looks to the legislative history
for Congress’s expression of intended change.226 In this sense, the canon not only allows, but requires, notice of significant changes in the
law to be buried in a legislative resource that merely supplements the
statute’s text.227
The Sherlock Holmes canon also differs from traditional continuity canons, including clear statement rules, in that it lacks any substantive grounding in the U.S. Constitution or even the common
law.228 As William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have demonstrated,
most clear statement rules derive from constitutional norms, such as
federalism limitations on the national government, state sovereignty,
the nondelegation doctrine, or the separation of powers between
branches.229 The Sherlock Holmes canon, by contrast, is untethered to
any constitutional or other meta- or background norms, resting instead on an ad hoc judicial estimation of the status quo legal rule in a
particular subject area. As a result, each application of the canon is
sui generis and lacks consistency from case to case. Judges invoking
the canon are not protecting legal principles rooted in our nation’s
founding charter; rather, they are protecting a policy choice reflected
in a previous version of a statute enacted by Congress or a judicial
practice established over several years—and they are doing so without
articulating any special reason to insulate such policy choices from
change by a later statute or amendment. As the next Section dis224

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).

225

See Kysar, supra note 11, at 962–63 (discussing these two “related” canons together).

226

See id.

227 A few of the dog that did not bark cases reference statutory text, indicating that one
would expect Congress to note the contemplated change in the text or the legislative history, but
most of the cases point exclusively to the lack of comment in the legislative record. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text.

R

R

228

See articles cited supra note 189.

R

229

See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 209.
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cusses, the canon thus opens the door to significant normative biases
in application.
B. A Default Rule with Normative Edge
As the discussion in Part II and Section III.A above suggests,
there is significant room for normative bias in judicial application of
the Sherlock Holmes canon. Rather than proceeding from a predetermined policy regarding a particular subject or constitutional norm, the
canon allows judges to make case-specific policy judgments about particular applications of the canon and to insist that Congress could not
have intended certain applications that the Court finds normatively
undesirable. And, in fact, we often see the Court making policy arguments in tandem with failure to comment or dog that did not bark
arguments. That is, the Justices’ conclusion in a particular case that
congressional failure to comment is significant often rests on their
normative disapproval of the change that otherwise would be worked.
Thus, in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,230 Justice Stevens’s
concurring opinion argued that “[c]ongressional silence is surely probative in this case because, despite the fact that awards of damages
and attorney’s fees could have potentially disastrous consequences for
the likely defendants in most private actions under the [Telecommunications Act of 1996], nowhere in the course of Congress’ lengthy deliberations is there any hint that Congress wanted damages or
attorney’s fees to be available.”231 Similarly, a number of the “bankruptcy rule” cases make the following observation: “If Congress had
intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other provision, to discharge state
criminal sentences, ‘we can be certain that there would have been
hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful,
so inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so likely to
arouse public outrage.’”232 Still other dog that did not bark cases
openly suggest that the contemplated legal change would work an absurd or irrational result.233
In such cases, it does not seem that the Court, or individual dissenting or concurring Justices, are consciously trying to effectuate policy judgments; rather, the looseness of the dog that did not bark canon
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
232 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth.
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 252 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50–51).
233 See supra note 65.
230
231
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allows this to occur unintentionally. That is, the Court (or an individual Justice) considers a particular statutory construction normatively
undesirable and then finds confirmation for its judgment in the Sherlock Holmes canon. The Justices’ reasoning might proceed as follows:
“This interpretation would have terrible consequences and works a
change in the law. Congress could not possibly have intended such a
horrendous rule change. The dog that did not bark canon presumes
that significant changes in the law will be mentioned in the legislative
record; if Congress had intended this horrible change in the legal rule,
someone surely would have discussed it or complained about it somewhere in the legislative record.”
Interestingly, although in my view the canon does a poor job of
approximating legislative intent, it seems to appeal most to—and to
be invoked most often by—those Justices who are most intentionalist
in their approach to statutory interpretation. As the Appendix demonstrates, Justice Stevens was by far the canon’s most frequent invoker, followed by Justice Rehnquist, also a strong intentionalist.234
Thus, it does not seem that the Justices are citing legislative intent as a
smokescreen for their policy judgments in these cases, at least not on
purpose. Rather, it appears that they are attempting to act as “faithful
agents” of the legislature, but that in doing so, they are bringing their
normative biases into the calculus—because the looseness of the dog
that did not bark canon allows them to do so. That is, the canon provides an escape hatch through which judges can protect norms or status quo legal rules with which they agree, while citing legislative
intent, rather than their own policy preferences, as the authority for
their statutory constructions. In this sense, the Sherlock Holmes canon again has much in common with clear statement rules, which
sometimes serve as a “safety valve” through which textualist judges
can protect legal principles that are important to them.235
C. A More Limited Dog that Did Not Bark Canon
Given the problems detailed in Parts II and III.B, it is worth asking whether inferences based on congressional failure to comment are
a justifiable, or reliable, interpretive aid. I think the answer is no—
See infra Appendix.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 935 (4th ed. 2007) (“For conservative textualists
who care about federalism, the safety valve when textualism gets them boxed in, as in Gregory
[v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)], is the creation of a super-strong clear statement rule that
trumps the result suggested by ordinary meaning.”).
234
235
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most of the time. The canon often serves as a poor proxy for legislative intent, as legislators may fail to comment on an intended change
for many legitimate reasons, including a belief that the change is obvious.236 Further, when considered in light of the values traditionally
served by continuity norms—e.g., predictability, protection of reliance
interests, forcing legislative deliberation—the canon fares poorly.
First, because the canon contains no baseline for measuring legal
change and no subject-matter boundaries, and because courts have invoked it inconsistently, it is questionable whether the canon serves to
enhance predictability and legitimacy in the manner that continuity
norms are meant to.237 Second, many of the cases in which the canon
is invoked involve little or no reliance interests that would be upset by
the contemplated statutory interpretation.238 Third, insofar as the canon calls for legislative specificity about narrow, precise applications
of a new law or amendment, it imposes a duty that Congress cannot
realistically follow through on, and thus seems incapable of forcing
legislative deliberation and clarity.239
For these reasons, this Article urges the following revised approach to the Sherlock Holmes canon: The canon should be applied
only in those limited circumstances in which there is strong reason
either to expect Congress to announce a change in the law or to require that Congress announce anticipated changes in the law. More
specifically, those limited circumstances should be defined as ones in
which (1) significant reliance interests would be unsettled by the contemplated interpretation; (2) the contemplated interpretation would
upset a longstanding agency interpretation of a statute without adequate notice; or (3) there is a subject-matter-specific, settled understanding such that Congress must announce a change in the law if it
intends one. In addition, it may make sense to limit the canon’s appliSee supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.A.
238 See generally Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011) (effect of amendment to
sentencing guidelines on previously entered plea deals); United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272
(2008) (carrying explosives “during the commission of” felony of making false statements to U.S.
Customs official); Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999)
(use of statistical sampling to determine population for congressional apportionment); Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (appealability of interlocutory orders by bankruptcy
courts); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (application of Voting Rights Act of 1965 to
state judicial elections); Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986) (reduction of EIT
credit for past-due child-support payments); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)
(“racketeering injury” requirement in RICO); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980)
(reviewability of EPA decision under statutory catchall).
239 See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text.
236
237
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cability based on the type of legislation being interpreted—that is, to
have different rules for omnibus legislation versus legislation dealing
with only one subject, or for legislation that was uncontroversial and
spawned little legislative discussion versus legislation that was controversial and generated lengthy legislative debates, and so on. Each of
these proposed limitations is discussed in turn below.
1. Reliance Interests
If a preexisting legal rule has generated significant reliance interests that would be upset by an unannounced, effectively sub silentio,
change in the law, that fact can and should justify application of the
dog that did not bark canon. INS v. St Cyr, discussed earlier, provides
a good example of reliance interests important enough to justify judicial imposition of a requirement that Congress announce changes to
those interests during the enactment process. St. Cyr was a lawful
permanent resident of the United States who pleaded guilty in March
1996 to a controlled substances charge.240 Under the law applicable at
the time of his guilty pleading, St. Cyr was eligible for a waiver of
deportation at the discretion of the Attorney General, who could take
into account various factors including St. Cyr’s ties to the community.241 However, in April and September of 1996, Congress enacted
AEDPA and IIRIRA, both of which eliminated the Attorney General’s discretion to grant waivers to persons convicted of crimes.242
Removal proceedings against St. Cyr were not commenced until April
10, 1997, after the effective dates of both statutes.243 St. Cyr and other
aliens in a position similar to his had substantial reliance interests in
not having the status quo legal rule about discretionary waivers
change on them midstream.244 The Supreme Court correctly refused
to apply AEDPA’s and IIRIRA’s discretion-stripping provisions to St.
Cyr’s conviction, relying, in part, on the Sherlock Holmes canon—
citing the absence of any discussion in the legislative record about
pending cases.245 There was strong reason to invoke the canon in this
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001).
Id.
242 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 240A(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594; St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 293.
243 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
244 See id. at 325 (noting that aliens “almost certainly relied upon” likelihood of discretionary relief by Attorney General when deciding whether to contest criminal charges at trial).
245 See id. at 320 n.44, 326.
240
241
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case, for if the Court had allowed the new AEDPA and IIRIRA provisions to apply to pending cases, without any indication of congressional intent to so apply them, it would have upset the reasonable
expectations of a number of aliens regarding an exceptionally important matter—their personal liberty.
2. Established Agency Interpretations
Another, related circumstance that should justify application of
the Sherlock Holmes canon is where an established agency interpretation of a statute is involved. When an administrative agency has put in
place a particular reading of a statute, and has implemented that reading for years, both the agency and those regulated by it rely on that
reading in structuring their behavior and in crafting collateral legal
rules. If Congress, in adopting a new statute or amendment, intends
to invalidate the agency’s reading of the statute, then we should expect Congress to make that intent clear to the agency, either in the
text or the legislative history of the statute. Moreover, even if we anticipate that Congress might sometimes be negligent in fulfilling this
expected duty, it makes sense for courts to impose an institutional
burden on Congress requiring it to make such abrogations of established agency interpretations clear—for signaling and notice purposes.
Without such notice, the agency may not realize that a new law has
overturned its settled interpretation of a statute, and may continue its
business as usual. Moreover, absent a clear signal from Congress,
courts can be expected to defer to the agency’s interpretation.246
Read in this light, cases such as Zuni Public School District No. 89 v.
Department of Education—in which the Court took note that the
agency head responsible for the established interpretation helped
draft the new amendment at issue, that neither he nor any legislator
observed that the amendment would require a change in the established agency reading, and that the agency continued to apply the regulation without change after the amendment was enacted—are correct
to infer that Congress did not intend for the amendment to undo the
agency’s longstanding interpretation.247
246 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001) (“[I]f the
statute is ‘silent or ambiguous’ with respect to the issue, then we must defer to a ‘reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.’ ” (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))).
247 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2007). Zuni also
could qualify as a “reliance interests” case, as school districts likely relied on the Department of
Education’s established calculation formula (the statutory interpretation at issue) in anticipating
how any federal aid they received would impact their other funding.
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3. Subject-Matter-Specific Presumptions
In addition, it makes sense to impose a presumption, or institutional burden, that Congress point out when it intends or understands
a new law to change the status quo legal rule in a subject area for
which there is an established, special requirement such that Congress
must announce changes in the law. That is, where there is a settled,
subject-matter-specific presumption that Congress does not intend to
change preexisting law when it enacts a new law or amendment, as
there is in bankruptcy law, then the legislative process and notice
problems that plague the Sherlock Holmes canon are diminished. In
the bankruptcy context, for example, because the Court long has recognized a presumption that changes in pre-Code practice will be
clearly announced, Congress is on notice that it needs to highlight any
intended changes in the legislative history if it wishes for them to be
acknowledged by the Court.248 There may still be looseness problems
with identifying the baseline from which to measure pre-Code practice, as Keith Sharfman has observed,249 but application of the canon
makes more sense when it reinforces background understandings in
the subject area. Moreover, in the bankruptcy context, there also are
likely to be significant reliance interests in maintaining the status quo
legal rule, as companies are likely to structure their dealings around
existing bankruptcy rules.250 Indeed, the very existence of the background norm that changes in pre-Code practice are to be presumed
against, absent clear congressional signaling to the contrary, increases
the likelihood that companies will rely on pre-existing rules.
Another example of where a subject-matter specific dog that did
not bark rule might make sense is with respect to the taxation of Native Americans—where the Court has recognized a background understanding that Native Americans are to enjoy special status under
the tax laws and has adopted a rule requiring an express legislative
statement in order to impose taxes on Native Americans.251 Because
the law long has treated Native Americans uniquely, the usual horizontal coherence problems that can attend the Sherlock Homes canon
248

See Keith Sharfman, Derivative Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 14

(2004).
249 Id. at 13; see also Keith Sharfman, Creditor(s’ Committee) Derivative Suits: A Reply to
Professor Bussel, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 38, 39 n.13, 40 (2004).
250

See Sharfman, supra note 248, at 13.

See Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976); see also California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (“[S]tate laws may be applied to tribal Indians on
their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.” (emphasis added)).
251
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are not at issue here.252 (Put differently, because background norms
dictate that Native Americans are unique, no other groups are “similarly situated” to them.) Moreover, notice and legislative process
problems are significantly reduced because of the expectations created by the longstanding rule requiring explicit announcement of any
decision to tax Native Americans.
4. Different Rules for Different Kinds of Statutes
In addition, it might make sense to limit application of the Sherlock Holmes canon to certain kinds of legislation. Political scientists
have shown that not all laws are created equally—and that many are
enacted through “unorthodox” procedures involving heavy involvement from party leaders or the bundling of numerous unrelated subjects into one bill, rather than the traditional committee drafting
process described in textbooks.253 Recent work by Abbe Gluck and
Lisa Bressman has highlighted how such differences in the process of
statutory enactment can affect the reliability of a statute’s legislative
history.254 The most obvious distinction is that between omnibus legislation and ordinary legislation. “Omnibus” is a term given to laws
that cover a number of diverse and unrelated subjects.255 Omnibus
legislation often is voluminous, running several hundreds or even
thousands of pages, and is enacted in hurried fashion, with little time
for debate.256 Gluck and Bressman found, among other things, that
omnibus laws tend to generate less, and more “confused,” legislative
history than do other kinds of statutes, usually because omnibus statutes involve the “throwing together” of different bills from various
committees.257 Conversely, Gluck and Bressman found that Congress
See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375–79; Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207–09.
See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS 111 (4th ed. 2012).
254 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 121, at 979–82.
255 SINCLAIR, supra note 253, at 111. “Omnibus” is an old term for a horse-drawn enclosed
bus, designed to carry a large number of passengers. Webster’s defines “omnibus” to mean
“providing for many things at once; having a variety of purposes or uses.” WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 993 (2d Collegiate ed. 1982).
256 See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 238 (2000)
(describing 950-page omnibus appropriations act that contained “eight regular appropriations
acts, dozens of ‘emergency supplemental’ appropriations, and a substantial amount of unrelated
legislation”); Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy
in Esnvironmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 660 (2006); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 457, 476 (1997); Katharine Q. Seelye, Spending Bill, Laden with Pork, Is Signed into Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at A24.
257 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 121, at 979.
252
253
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takes more care with the legislative history of appropriations bills than
it does with other kinds of statutes, and that the legislative history
often contains the “meat” of appropriations statutes, with the text
serving only to convey dollar amounts.258
Such findings beg the question whether courts should treat omnibus laws and appropriations laws differently, when it comes to application of the Sherlock Homes canon, than they treat other kinds of
statutes. One might argue, for example, that the canon should not be
applied to omnibus legislation, as Congress does not tend to comment
very much during the process of enacting such legislation and as comments made during the enactment process are not very reliable, given
the “thrown together” nature of such laws. Conversely, one might argue that appropriations bills are good candidates for application of the
Sherlock Holmes canon, as members of Congress, or at least their
staff, take pains to ensure that the legislative history of such statutes
explains what the statute means.
For purposes of this Article, I do not make any firm recommendations regarding how courts should apply the Sherlock Holmes canon to different kinds of statutes, or to statutes that have undergone
different enactment processes. Our understanding of differences that
arise in the process of enacting different kinds of statutes and what
those differences mean for the legislative history produced is only beginning to emerge. For now, it is enough to flag that courts should pay
attention to what kind of statute they are interpreting when contemplating inferring meaning from congressional failure to comment, and
should consider applying the Sherlock Holmes canon only when there
is reason to believe that Congress was likely to comment on any intended changes in the legislative history.
CONCLUSION
The Sherlock Homes canon has played a curious and inconsistent
role in many of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases.
To date, scholars have largely ignored the canon, or assumed without
examination that it serves a benevolent—or at least harmless—function.259 This Article has examined how the Supreme Court employs
the canon in practice, seeking to bring some coherence to the Court’s
eclectic and unpredictable use of dog that did not bark arguments. It
has argued that the Sherlock Holmes canon suffers from several prac258
259

Id. at 980–82.
See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 11, at 963–64.
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tical and theoretical problems and, contrary to conventional wisdom,
serves as a poor proxy for actual congressional intent. Given these
limitations, the Article argues for a more circumscribed judicial approach to inferences based on congressional failure to comment in the
legislative record. Throughout, its aim has been to bring theoretical
attention to this understudied interpretive canon—so that lawyers,
judges, and scholars can appreciate and evaluate critically the role that
the canon plays, and should play, in statutory interpretation.
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APPENDIX260
Case Name*

Opinion
Type

Authoring
Justice

“No Mention” Cases
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014).

Dissenting

Ginsburg

Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685
(2011).

Concurring

Sotomayor

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543
U.S. 50 (2004).

Majority

Ginsburg

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

Majority

Stevens

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564 (1982).

Dissenting

Stevens

Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S.
280 (2010).

Dissenting

Sotomayor

United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272 (2008).

Dissenting

Breyer

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of
Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007).

Majority

Breyer

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544
U.S. 113 (2005).

Concurring

Stevens

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S.
132 (2005).

Majority

Roberts

Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).

Plurality

O’Connor

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997).

Dissenting

Stevens

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

Majority

Rehnquist

Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
155 (1993).

Majority

Stevens

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249
(1992).

Concurring

Stevens

“Silence-Is-Telling” Cases

Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).

Majority

Stevens

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484
U.S. 9 (1987).

Majority

Rehnquist

Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S.
388 (1987).

Majority

White

Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851
(1986).

Dissenting

Stevens

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985).

Majority

White

260 The cases listed in this Appendix were compiled by using a word search in Westlaw for
“sherlock ‘conan doyle’ dog & (legislative /s history record) congress!” The resulting cases were
examined closely to determine whether they employed some form of the dog that did not bark
argument. The list also was supplemented with cases I independently knew contained a failure
to comment argument.
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Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981).

Majority

Powell

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578
(1980).

Dissenting

Rehnquist

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

Dissenting

Powell

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978).

Dissenting

Powell

Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).

Majority

Brennan

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386
U.S. 523 (1967).

Dissenting

Douglas

Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947).

Dissenting

Frankfurter

Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).

Majority

Kennedy

Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552 (1990), superseded by statute,
Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865, 2865, as
recognized in Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 83 n.4 (1991).

Dissenting

Blackmun

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S.
235 (1989).

Dissenting

O’Connor

United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365 (1988).

Majority

Scalia

Bankruptcy Cases

